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THE COLLATERAL MORTGAGE
Max Nathan, Jr.* and H. Gayle Marshall**
Mortgage is one of the most desirable and powerful security
interests that can be granted creditors, conferring as it does the
power to have the mortgaged property seized and sold and the
proceeds of the sale applied to satisfy the debt with preference
and priority over other creditors.1 Properly handled, the mort-
gage not only confers priority as to the proceeds of sale but
the mortgagee can pursue the property and preserve his rights
even if ownership is transferred to a third person.m 2 Lacking
the disadvantage of pledge, namely dispossession of the debtor,
and having the advantage of very stable security such as im-
movables,8 mortgage is a security device favored by borrowers
and lenders alike.
Although the Louisiana Civil Code describes mortgages as
being either conventional, legal or judicial,4 there are in fact
several kinds of conventional mortgages. The Code itself rec-
ognizes the ordinary conventional mortgage," granted for a spe-
cific debt, and the mortgage to secure future advances.0 In both
instances, the mortgage is an accessorial obligation, dependent
upon an underlying valid principal obligation for its existence.7
Both the ordinary conventional mortgage and the mortgage to
secure future advances, of course, are special forms of conven-
tional mortgages8 and arise only by contract.
* Associate Professor of Law, Tulane University; Member, New Orleans
Bar.
** Member, Lake Charles Bar.
1. Lo. Civ. CoDa art. 3278.
2. See generally LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 1092, 2335-43, 2371-81, 2643, 372148,
5154.
3. The collateral mortgage may be used in the mortgage of chattels
also. See generally TA. R.S. 9:5351-56 (1950).
4. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3287.
5. LA. Civ. CoDS arts. 3290-91.
6. LA. CiV. COos arts. 3292-93. See also LA. R.S. 9:4801 which subordinates
private works privileges to mortgages for future advances when "the mort-
gage has been recorded and the note delivered to the lender before any
work or labor has begun . .. .
7. LA. Civ. Com art. 3284.
8. The legal mortgage and the judicial mortgage are general mortgages,
which means that they do not require a description of particular property
but apply to all immovables of the debtor, then owned or thereafter
acquired. LA. CIV. CoD arts. 3320, 3328. They do not arise by contract, but
by operation of law. Conventional mortgages, however, can only arise by
contract and, being special mortgages, can only cover particular property
described in the act of mortgage. LA. Civ. CoD arts. 8305-06.
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The Louisiana jurisprudence has spawned a third kind of
conventional mortgage, the "collateral mortgage," described most
succinctly by Professor Harry Sachse as "the strange alchemy
of the pledge of a mortgage created by the pledgor."9 Histori-
cally, the ordinary conventional mortgage that secures a stated
present advance was the first mortgage-type security device to
be utilized in Louisiana legal and banking practice.10 In response
to the needs of a society rapidly developing into a commercial
state, faced with the limited commercial possibilities of the
ordinary conventional mortgage, and as a concession to the com-
mercial establishment, the redactors of the Louisiana Civil Code
of 1825 drafted two new articles sanctioning a mortgage that
would secure future advances." To overcome certain limitations
of this codal mortgage to secure future advances, however, Lou-
isiana practitioners developed the collateral mortgage. 2 As its
very name implies, the collateral mortgage is not designed
directly to secure an existing debt, like the ordinary conven-
tional mortgage, nor necessarily to secure advances to be made,
like the mortgage to secure future advances, but instead to
create a mortgage note that can be pledged as collateral secu-
rity for either a pre-existing debt, or for a debt created con-
temporaneously with the mortgage, or for a future debt or debts,
or even for a series of debts. Because the collateral mortgage
departs from recognized mortgage concepts, but at the same time
relies upon mortgage concepts; because it is used for specific
present debts and for unspecified future debts; but mostly be-
cause of the weird blend of pledge and mortgage, drawing upon
both for its efficacy but not fully on either, the collateral mort-
gage has been a source of unfortunate confusion and bizarre
litigation. Consequently, despite its extraordinary commercial
importance and utility, the collateral mortgage has been and is
frequently misunderstood. The authors believe that familiarity
9. Sachse, Report to the Louisiwna Law InUsttute on Article Nine of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 41 TUL. L. Rzv. 785, 799 (1967).
10. See Code Napoleon arts. 2114-20 (1804); 2 M. PLANIOL & G. RWmT,
Treatise on the Civtl Law nos. 2308-22, 2645, 2656-61 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst.
transl. 1959).
11. LA. Crv. CODs arts. 3259-60 (1825). These two articles were carried into
the Civil Code of 1870 as articles 3292 and 3293, respectively.
12. The collateral mortgage was recognized in the following early cases:
Levy v. Ford, 41 La. Ann. 873, 6 So. 671 (1880); Merchants' Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Jamison, 25 La. Ann. 364 (1873); Succession of Dolhande, 21 La. Ann. 3
(1869).
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with the device will breed clarity, not contempt, and hope by
this article to dispel some of the unnecessary confusion.
MECHANICS FOR CREATION OF COLLATERAL MORTGAGE
Act of Mortgage
The first step in the creation and granting of a collateral
mortgage is for the mortgagor to execute an act of mortgage,
acknowledging an indebtedness in the act of mortgage, and
stating that he intends to use the "mortgage note" to raise funds.
The mortgage is drawn in favor of any future holder or holders
of the "mortgage note," who are represented in the act of mort-
gage by a nominal mortgagee. For illustration, the following
language, while not sacrosanct, may be found in many col-
lateral mortgages:
"Which said appearer declared unto me, Notary, that desir-
ing to secure funds from any person, firm or corporation
willing to loan same, and for such purpose said Mortgagor
does by these presents declare and acknowledge a debt in
the sum of ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
AND NO/100 ($1,100,000.00) DOLLARS, and to evidence
such indebtedness has executed under date of these presents
one (1) certain promissory note for the said sum of ONE
MILLION ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND AND NO/100
($1,100,000.00) DOLLARS, made payable to the order of
BEARER, on demand, at 1010 Common Street, New Orleans,
Louisiana, which said note stipulates to bear interest at
the rate of eight (8%) per cent per annum from date until
paid, which said note after having been paraphed "ne
varietur" by me, Notary, for identification herewith, was
delivered to the said Mortgagor, who acknowledged receipt
thereof, and said Mortgagor further declared that said note
would be negotiated for the purpose of raising funds as here-
tofore stated, and said mortgagor does by these presents
acknowledge to be indebted unto any future holder or
holders of said note in the full amount thereof, together
with interest, attorney's fees, insurance premiums, taxes and
costs, if any should accrue."' 3
13. Some practitioners use the following language in the preparation of
collateral mortgages: "And here the said mortgagor declared that this
mortgage is executed and granted for the equal benefit and security of
1973]
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Although the ranking of the collateral mortgage is not deter-
mined by date of filing or recordation in the parish mortgage
records, as will be discussed later, it goes without saying that
the act of mortgage must be recorded in order to affect third
parties. 4 Recordation is generally made as promptly as possible
after execution of the act of mortgage.
"Ne Varietur" Note
In conjunction with the act of mortgage, the mortgagor
executes a promissory note that is generally payable to "Bearer,"
although it may be payable to his own order and endorsed by
him. 5 The promissory note is then paraphed "ne varietur" by
the notary public for identification with the act of collateral
mortgage. Although all practitioners will understand the phrase
"paraphed 'ne varietur,"' many students have had difficulty with
the concept of paraphing a note, as well as the use of the term
"ne varietur." The words "ne varietur" come from Latin and
simply mean "it must not be altered." Paraphing means that
the notary public signs the promissory note with his official
signature, thereby certifying its genuineness, and marks or writes
on it an inscription similar to the following:
"Ne Varietur for identification with an Act
of Collateral Mortgage passed before me this
day of , 19
s/ Notary Public
Paraphing, then, is nothing more than the Notary's act of signing
any and all future holder or holders of the hereinabove described note at
whatever period or for whatever cause or for any reason whatsoever said
note may be issued or reissued, the purpose of the present act being to
enable said mortgagor to pledge, pawn, hypothecate and deliver, on such
terms as said mortgagor may deem advisable and proper, the said note
as collateral security to secure such loan or loans as said mortgagor may
from time to time desire to make. It is understood and agreed that pos-
session of the said note at any time by the said mortgagor herein shall
not in any manner extinguish the said note or this mortgage, and the
mortgagor shall have the right to issue and reissue the said note from
time to time as his interest or conveniences may require, without in any
manner extinguishing or affecting the obligation of said note or the security
of this mortgage."
14. LA. Civ. CODa art. 3342; McDufille v. Walker, 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100
(1909).
15. The note may be payable to some nominal holder, although this is
not customary. A major purpose in having the note as bearer paper is
that it can then be transferred without requiring an authentic act, which
would otherwise be essential in order to obtain executory process. See IA.
CoDs Cv. P. art. 2635, comment (d).
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and marking or writing on the promissory note.15A By paraphing
the promissory note "ne varietur," the notary makes it inextri-
cably bound with and identified with the act of mortgage so that
the note thereby incorporates all the terms and conditions of the
mortgage and certifies that it is genuine.'0
Acceptance
A nominal holder (usually a secretary in the notary's office)
appears and accepts the mortgage for all future holders. As a
practical matter, the note is delivered to the mortgagor, who
will subsequently pledge it to secure a debt, but to avoid any
problem of extinction of the mortgage, someone should tech-
nically accept the mortgage on the terms and conditions shown,
namely that the note will be negotiated and used as collateral.
To represent any future holders of the note and accept for them,
a secretary is always convenient, but she obviously has no real
interest in the transaction.17
Pledge of the "Ne Varietur" Note
The next step is critical in the confection of the total (and
completed) security device, being the stage at which pledge
15A. Technically, as used in Louisiana law, the word "paraph" means
the official signature of the notary public. See Harz v. Gowland, 126 La.
674, 52 So. 986 (1910). The word has an interesting origin. It is derived from
the French "parafe" or "paraphe," and is a contraction of the word
"paragraphe." As a noun, the French "parafe" or "paraphe" refers to a
flourish after one's signature; as an infinitive, "parafer" or "parapher"
means to put one's flourish, dash or initials to something. See CASSELL'S NEW
FRENCH DICTIONARY, 5th ed. (1951), p. 517. As originally used, the flourish
at the end of the signature was a safeguard against forgery. Similarly,
"[t]he paraph [of the notary public] is the official signature, and evidence
of the reality and genuineness of the note on which it is written." Harz v.
Gowland, 126 La. at 678. See article 3384, Louisiana Civil Code of 1870,
which requires the notary's signature and the inscription of identification.
16. In the ordinary conventional mortgage, the "ne varietur" note would
be the evidence of the debt and any payments made on the debt should
be marked on the face of the note and the amount of the indebtedness
thereby reduced. With the collateral mortgage, however, the execution of
the "ne varietur" note, and the paraphing of that note by the notary, are
only the second step in the series of steps. Another reason to paraph the
note Is that the note Is then in authentic form and can be used for execu-
tory process. See Reed v. Meaux, 262 So.2d 570 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972). See
also note 18 infra.
17. Amusingly, one young lawyer advised the authors that when he
first started practice he encountered a number of collateral mortgages, all
of which showed a secretary In the office as the first mortgagee. He was
dismayed to learn later that she was not a wealthy lender at all but only
a nominee.
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enters the picture. The collateral mortgage note, i.e., the "ne
varietur" note, is not the indebtedness; it is merely the security
that will be pledged as collateral for the true debt. Consequently,
the next step is for the mortgagor to become also a pledgor: he
pledges the "ne varietur" note and the act of mortgage itself
to the creditor to secure a debt. This debt is evidenced by what
is commonly called a "hand note" that contains appropriate
provisions to be secured by pledge. Thus, the "hand note" will
contain all of the customary clauses and conditions for pledge
and at some point on the hand note there will be language
substantially similar to the following:
"This note is secured by the pledge of one certain Collateral
Mortgage note executed by John Doe as Mortgagor before
Frank Roe, Notary Public, dated "
The evidence of indebtedness, then, is not the collateral mort-
gage note ("ne varietur" note), but the hand note behind which
the collateral mortgage note is pledged.18
18. A diagram of the collateral mortgage transaction is as follows:
mortgageI
pledge
1 3 hand note
Sne varletur
note
The "ne varietur" note and mortgage are pledged to secure the, hand note.[Editor's Note. See Professor Crawford's article In this issue for discussion
of the hand note as the evidence of the Indebtedness.]
Subsequent to the submission of the draft of this article, the First
Circuit Court of Appeal decided the case of S~lidell Building Supply, Inc. V.
lD.SJ. Mortgage Corp., 273 So.2d 343, torits denied, 274 So.2d 708 (1973),
which was a suit to annul an order of seizure and sale of mortgaged prop-
erty under executory process. The mortgage was a collateral mortgage, and
the mortgagor challenged the order of seizure and sale on the ground that
the hand notes should have been presented for the purpose of proving
the debt and that executory process was improper since the hand notes
were not authentic. Article 2635 of the Code of Civil Procedure, requires
all evidence to prove the right to executory process to be authentic, and
states that one such exhibit shall be "the note, bond, or other instrument
evidencing the obligation secured by the mortgage or privilege . . .. " It
was contended that since the hand notes evidence the actual obligation,(as pointed out in this article), they should be presented and should be
authentic. The Court rejected this argument and held that the collateral
mortgage ("ne vartetur") note is "the instrument evidencing the, obligation
secured by the mortgage." A similar conclusion was reached in Scarborough
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Coordination of Notes
Obviously, this use of multiple notes can give rise to prob-
lems, and the careful lender will be sure that certain terms
and conditions of the collateral mortgage note co-ordinate with
corresponding terms and conditions of the hand note. For
example, if the collateral mortgage note provides for attorney's
fees, but the hand note does not, the lender is not entitled to
recover attorney's fees.1 The careful attorney will make sure
that the provision for attorney's fees in the "ne varietur" note
co-ordinates with the provision for attorney's fees in the hand
note; and, obviously, if the attorney's fees are fixed as a per-
centage of the amount claimed, the percentages should co-ordi-
nate. Similarly, there may be a discrepancy in interest rates.
If the "ne varietur" note provides for 10% interest, but the hand
note behind which the "ne varietur" note is pledged provides
only for 8% interest, then the creditor is entitled to recover
and is secured only to the extent of the 8% interest rate. The
hand note is the evidence of the debt, and the "ne varietur" note
is the collateral security, so that co-ordination is essential: if
the term (e.g., attorney's fees) is provided for in the hand note,
but not in the "ne varietur" note, then the creditor is entitled
to recover, but is not secured, as to that item; if the term is
provided for in the "ne varietur" note, but not in the hand note,
then the creditor is not only unsecured, but not entitled to
recover that particular item because it is not part of the debt.19A
v. Duke, 251 So.2d 55 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971). The result, we think, is
correct and it is not inconsistent with the analysis of this article. The hand
note is the actual indebtedness. But the mortgage note is the instrument
"secured by the mortgage." Again, one must view the collateral mortgage
as a total security device and not merely one aspect of the device. The
Code of Civil Procedure does not require authentic form for the "instru-
ment evidencing the obligation," which would be the hand note, but for
the "instrument evidencing the obligation secured by the mortgage," and
that instrument is the mortgage note, not the hand note. The court's con-
clusion in Slidell Building Supply, right or wrong so far as executory process
is concerned, is not inconsistent with the analysis of the collateral mort-
gage in this article. The court's conclusion is in fact consistent with our
analysis viewing the collateral mortgage as a whole: one can legitimately
read article 2635 of the Code of Civil Procedure as not requiring the hand
note to be authentic and yet recognize that the hand note evidences the
debt, while the collateral evidences the obligation secured by the mortgage.
See also Cameron State Bank v. Duhon, 263 So.2d 433 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1972).
19. See Odom v. Cherokee Homes, Inc., 165 So.2d 855, 871-73 (La. App.
4th Cir.), writs denied, 246 La. 867, 167 So.2d 677 (1964).
19A. It is of course not uncommon in practice for the act of mortgage
and "ne varietur" note to be for an amount greater than the amount that
1973]
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Issuance and Reissuance
The pledge of the "ne varietur" note to secure the hand
note is commonly referred to as "issuance." The term "issuance"
is important for, unlike the ordinary conventional mortgage that
is effective upon filing in the mortgage office (if it is actually
and promptly recorded thereafter)20 the act of collateral mort-
gage may be recorded and remain dormant for months, if not
years, and only obtains ranking against third parties from the
time of "issuance," i.e., when the "ne varietur" note is pledged
to secure the debt.21 Also, unlike the ordinary conventional mort-
gage, when the debt is paid, and the hand note is marked "paid,"
and the hand note and the "ne varietur" note are returned to
the mortgagor-pledgor, the collateral mortgage is not extin-
guished. The mortgage does, however, lose its original ranking
and becomes dormant.2 2 If the pledgor-mortgagor desires to bor-
row money and use the security of the collateral mortgage again,
he can execute another hand note and secure it by pledge of
the "ne varietur" note, exactly as he did the first time; the
difference is that second and subsequent pledges of the "ne
varietur" note are called "reissuance," and the collateral mort-
gage obtains a new rank: the date of reissuance.
The procedure of pledging one note to secure another note
illustrates that the collateral mortgage is an exception to the
rule that mortgage is an accessory obligation.2 In the ordinary
the mortgagor intends to borrow. For example, the mortgagor may create
a mortgage for $50,000 but only borrow $35,000. Obviously, the debt can
only be enforced for the true indebtedness, here $35,000. Also, In commer-
cial practice, it is common for the mortgage and "ne varietur" note to
stipulate a higher rate of interest than may be stipulated in the initial loan
or hand notes. Clearly, the creditor can only recover and is only secured
for the interest provided in the hand note. But the higher amount and
higher interest rate in the mortgage protect the creditor if he later advances
more funds or if interest rates rise. For example, the collateral mortgage
may provide 10% interest, but at the outset the borrower only borrows at
the rate of 8%. In a period of rising interest rates the parties could increase
the effective rate of Interest simply by new hand notes rather than con-
tinually cancelling old and re-executing new acts of mortgage each time
the interest rate changes.
20. Kinnebrew v. Tri-Con Prod. Corp., 224 La. 879, 154 So.2d 433 (1963);
Opelousas Fin. Co. v. Reddell, 119 So. 770 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1929); see also
Note, 1 LA. L. Rov. 231 (1938).
21. Odom v. Cherokee Homes, Inc., 165 So.2d 855, 865 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
writs denied, 246 La. 867, 167 So.2d 667 (1964).
22. See, e.g., Morris v. Executors of Cain, 39 La. Ann. 712, 1 So. 797
(1887).
23. See LA. Civ. CoDe art. 3284.
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conventional mortgage there is an act of mortgage and a promis-
sory note paraphed "ne varietur" for identification with the act
of mortgage, and that note itself is the principal obligation
secured by the accessory obligation of the mortgage. In the
collateral mortgage situation, the "ne varietur" note is not the
indebtedness at all; the "ne varietur" note, rather, is only to
be used as collateral, the security that is pledged to the creditor
to secure another note. The true indebtedness is the debt that
the collateral mortgage "ne varietur" note is pledged to secure.
Thus, while the "ne varietur" note is generally a note payable
on demand, it does not represent a specific debt. It may be
pledged behind another demand note; it may be pledged behind
a term note that would not mature until a specified date; or it
may well be pledged behind a hand note that is payable in
installments. But, in any event, the terms and conditions of the
hand note represent the indebtedness and govern the payment
schedule for the borrower.
Because the hand note is the true evidence of indebtedness,
and the "ne varietur" note is merely collateral, any payments
that are made by the borrower to the lender are applied directly
to the hand note, and not to the "ne varietur" note. Assuming
that the borrower has executed an act of collateral mortgage for
an amount "up to" the sum of $50,000, the mortgage has been
properly recorded, and the "ne varietur" note has been pledged
to secure a loan of $10,000, represented by a hand note in that
amount, the creditor at this point is holding two notes; if he
makes no further advances to the borrower, and the borrower
begins to repay the loan, any payments that are made will be
applied to the hand note and not to the "ne varietur" note. If
payment of the $10,000 plus interest is made in full, then the
hand note is marked "paid" and both the hand note and the
"ne varietur" note are returned to the borrower. But the "ne
varietur" note is not marked in any way; it, too, is returned
to the debtor and can then be used to cancel the mortgage or
be reissued to secure another debt. In order to cancel the inscrip-
tion of the mortgage, the debtor must present the "ne varietur"
note to the recorder of mortgages, following the proper proce-
dures for cancellation of an inscription of mortgage; the hand
note is not recorded and obviously the mere presentation of a
hand note marked "paid" would be insufficient to obtain can-
1973]
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cellation of the inscription of the mortgage. In the ordinary
conventional mortgage, however, payments made by the debtor
to the creditor are applied to the "ne varietur" note, which is
the evidence of the indebtedness, and such payments pro tanto
reduce the indebtedness and to that extent extinguish the mort-
gage.
DIsTINCTION BETWE EFFECT OF RECORDATION AND PRESCRIPTION
The basic procedures outlined above as the mechanics for
the operation of the collateral mortgage give rise to some highly
unusual legal characteristics unique to the collateral mortgage
device. One area plays variations on the theme of prescription.
At the outset it should be remembered that there is a distinct
difference between effect of recordation and prescription, i.e.,
between efficacy and ranking as to third persons based on the
public records on the one hand, and prescription of the principal
obligation on the other. Thus, the Civil Code provides in article
3369 that where the principal obligation secured by a mortgage
matures in less than nine years, the recordation of the mortgage
is effective as to third persons, for ranking purposes, for ten
years, which ranking is lost if the mortgage is not reinscribed
in the public records within the ten year period. If the principal
obligation matures more than nine years from the date of the
act, then the recordation of the inscription is effective, for rank-
ing purposes, until six years after the maturity of the obligation.
Article 3369, however, applies only with regard to efficacy as
to third persons, and it clearly assumes a valid principal obliga-
tion. If the principal obligation has been extinguished, and the
mortgage has thereby fallen, then article 3369 is no longer
operative, much less relevant. In other words, a mortgage may
be valid as between the parties, but have no effect as to third
persons because of failure to inscribe or reinscribe; or, the
obligation may be extinguished, in which event it would not
have effect as to anyone regardless of recordation. By way
of illustration, a person may execute an ordinary mortgage
securing a demand note in the amount of $10,000; under article
3369 the recordation of the mortgage would be effective as to
third parties for a ten year period. If the mortgagor makes pay-
ments of interest on the demand note regularly for the entire
ten year period, then the mortgage is still valid as between the
[Vol. 33
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parties, and the full debt is viable and owing. But if the mort-
gagee fails to reinscribe the mortgage within the ten year period,
then the mortgage is no longer effective as to third parties and
would be primed by any intervening encumbrances. By the
same token, if the mortgagor makes no payments of interest
or principal and no other acknowledgment of the debt, since
the prescriptive period on demand notes is five years from the
date of the note, then five years after the execution of the note,
the principal obligation would prescribe, and the mortgage would
fall with it; article 3369 at that point becomes totally irrelevant
and it does not matter that the mortgage is recorded. Since, in
the collateral mortgage situation, the "ne varietur" note is almost
invariably a demand note, the act of collateral mortgage should
unquestionably be reinscribed within ten year periods in order
to preserve efficacy as to third persons. Inscription and reinscrip-
tion, however, as illustrated above, only concern effect as to third
persons and have nothing whatsoever to do with the question
of validity of the mortgage or prescription.
ImPREScRIPTIBILITY oF TE HAND NoTE
A unique advantage of the collateral mortgage device is that
the "hand note," which is the true evidence of indebtedness,
is imprescriptible. It is a well-recognized principle of Louisiana
law that where a debt is secured by pledge, the holding of the
pledged item by the creditor serves as a constant acknowledg-
ment of the debt by the debtor so as to continually interrupt
prescription.24 Thus, in Scott v. Corkern,25 where a promissory
note was secured by the pledge of a life insurance policy, and
nearly 30 years had passed with no payments or other acknowl-
edgments of the debt, the court nonetheless found that the
principal obligation had not prescribed because the existence of
the pledge served continually to interrupt prescription. 6 Apply-
ing this legal principle, the pledge of the "ne varietur" note
serves as a constant acknowledgment of the debt that is evi-
denced by the hand note and thereby continually interrupts
prescription on the hand note. There is even jurisprudence to
the effect that if one promissory note is pledged to secure another
promissory note, and the note that is pledged prescribes, none-
24. See Scott v. Corkern, 231 La. 368, 91 So.2d 569 (1956).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 378, 91 So.2d at 572.
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theless, the prescribed note will serve to continually interrupt
prescription on the other note.2 So long, then, as the creditor
holds the "ne varietur" note in pledge behind the hand note,
the hand note is imprescriptible.
PRESCRIPTION OF THE "NE VARIETUR" NOTE
The "ne varietur" note itself can prescribe, and being a
demand note, the prescriptive period on the "ne varietur" note
is five years. For that reason, until recently, it has been the cus-
tomary practice to have the mortgagor sign a written acknowl-
edgement on the "ne varietur" note within five years after
execution of the note (and thereafter to repeat the procedure
within five year periods) to prevent prescription from running.
If he failed to do so, the "ne varietur" note prescribed, and
while the hand note would nonetheless remain a valid obliga-
tion, it would no longer be secured by a mortgage and would
simply reflect an unsecured debt (not "unsecured" legally, but
unsecured practically in the sense that the security is virtually
worthless, being the pledge of a prescribed note). All too often
lenders neglected or forgot (or were not advised) to obtain the
written acknowledgement every five years, and found them-
selves holding prescribed mortgage notes. As a result, the Lou-
isiana legislature enacted a special statute in 1970 to remedy
the problem of prescription on notes such as the "ne varietur"
note as it is used in the collateral mortgage situation. R.S. 9:5807
provides as follows:
"The partial payment of a promissory note by the maker
thereof shall interrupt prescription upon any. and all other
promissory notes which have been pledged by said maker
to secure the payment of the promissory note upon which
the partial payment was made, if the pledged notes are held
by the creditor to whom the partial payment was made,
provided that in all such cases the creditor shall sustain the
burden of proof that the pledged notes were in fact pledged
to secure the note upon which the partial note [sic] was
paid by the maker and that at the time of the partial pay-
27. Succession of Picard, 238 La. 455, 115 So.2d 817 (1959). In Picard, the
court held that it is not necessary that the thing pledged have value, only
that the thing be actually pledged. See also Meyer Bros., Ltd. v. Colvin, 122
La. 153, 47 So. 447 (1908).
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ment the creditor receiving the partial payment was the
holder of the pledged note or notes."2
Heretofore, if M mortgaged Blackacre by collateral mort-
gage and pledged the "ne varietur" note to P, as M made pay-
ments to P, P would credit these payments on the hand note
but not on the "ne varietur" note. While such payment would
constitute an acknowledgment to interrupt prescription on the
hand note, acknowledgment was unnecessary, because the hand
note was already imprescriptible. If no payments were made or
credited on the "ne varietur" note, or if there were no acknowl-
edgment of it made, then five years after the execution of the
mortgage and "ne varietur" note, the "ne varietur" note would
prescribe.29 Applying the language of R.S. 9:5807 to the collateral
mortgage situation in the illustration given above, when M
pledges the "ne varietur" note to P and makes payment to P,
then the "partial payment" of the "promissory note" by M, "the
maker thereof," would "interrupt prescription" on the "ne
varietur" note, being an "other promissory note" which has been
"pledged" by M, the maker, to secure the payment of the promis-
sory note (hand note) upon which the partial payment was
made. The sole proviso is that the "ne varietur" note (the
pledged note) must be held by the creditor (P) to whom the
partial payment is made; P must prove that the "ne varietur"
note was in fact pledged to secure the hand note upon which
payment was made and that P was the holder of both notes.
R.S. 9:5807 fits the collateral mortgage situation like a glove,
and was clearly intended to cover the very problem of prescrip-
tion of the "ne varietur" note as outlined above. Unfortunately,
the statute is not artfully drafted and may be overly broad.
Being of recent vintage, the statute has not yet been tested in
the courts. One can easily imagine the problems in its applica-
tion. For example, suppose M does not pledge his own collateral
mortgage "ne varietur" note when he borrows money from P,
but rather pledges the note of another party, e.g., a note from
D that is made payable to M. When M makes payments to P on
M's debt to P, then, under the literal terms of the statute those
payments would interrupt prescription on the note of D that is
payable to M. The pledge of notes of third persons is not
28. LA. R.S. 9:5807 (Supp. 1970).
29. In practice, many creditors overlooked the requirement of such
acknowledgment of the "ne varietur" note within five years, and many
others were unaware of it.
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uncommon in practice, but it is highly improbable that the
Legislature intended to cover such situations by R.S. 9:5807.
Nevertheless, under the literal terms of the statute, in the illus-
tration of the pledge of a third person's note, the partial payment
by M shall interrupt prescription "upon any and all other
promissory notes which have been pledged by said maker" to
secure the payment of the note upon which he makes partial
payment. It is very doubtful, if not inconceivable, that the courts
would strain the rules of prescription so far as to permit the
interruption of prescription on a third person's obligation in
such a fashion. Consequently, until the statute has been judicially
construed and upheld, there is some danger that the statute,
having been drafted overly broad, may be held invalid in the
very area where it is needed, namely, to prevent prescription
from running on the "ne varietur" note that has been pledged
to secure a hand note, where both are notes of the same maker.
Because of this potential danger area with R.S. 9:5807 judicially
untested, the authors of this article recommend that unless and
until the statute is construed and (hopefully) upheld by the
courts, the best practice will be to continue to have the maker
execute a written acknowledgment on the "ne varietur" note
within the five year period from its execution and thereby
obviate any question of prescription or reliance on the statute.
DISTINCTION FROM ORDINARY CONVENTIONAL MORTGAGE--
ABILITY TO REVIVE
The ordinary conventional mortgage is made to secure a
specific debt, and the mortgage is identified with that debt, so
that when the debt is paid, the mortgage expires. 0 The rule,
of course, is merely a corollary of the principle that mortgage
is an accessorial obligation requiring a valid principle obliga-
tion for its existence. And, unlike Lazarus, a mortgage that is
extinguished cannot be revived. The rule is well settled in Lou-
isiana jurisprudence that "when a mortgage is given for a
specific debt to a particular creditor, payment of that debt extin-
guishes the mortgage and a reissue of the note will not revive
or reinstate the mortgage."' 1 If the drawer reissues the note, he
may be legally bound on the reissued note, but he cannot revive
30. LA. Civ. CODE art. 3285.
31. Mente & Co. v. Levy, 160 La. 496, 501, 107 So. 318, 320 (1926). See also
LA. Civ. CODE art. 3285.
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the accessorial obligation of mortgage.32 If, however, the mort-
gage is not for a specific debt, but for as yet undetermined
future advances, and if the mortgage is in favor of any future
holder, then the mortgage ("ne varietur") note may be returned
to the maker, and the return does not cancel the mortgage.
The note may be used as collateral and reissued for other and
different debts, which acts revive and reinstate the mortgage.U
When the collateral mortgage note is returned to the maker,
the mortgage merely becomes dormant, not extinguished; it
simply remains dormant until a reissue of the note.
DIsTINcTION FROM ORDINARY CONVENTIONAL MORTGAGE-RANKING
Prior to 1910, a mortgage was not effective against third
persons until it was actually recorded,34 but in 1910 the Lou-
isiana legislature enacted Act No. 215, sections 1 and 2, now
R.S. 9:5141, which provides:
"All acts or instruments of writing which import mortgage
or privilege, when filed for record with the Recorder of
Mortgages, shall be immediately indorsed by him with the
date, hour and minute of filing, which indorsement shall
be recorded with the registry of the instrument.
"All such instruments shall be effective against all per-
sons from the time of their filing." (Emphasis added.)
Undoubtedly, the statute was designed to place mortgages on
the same footing with conveyances, which throughout Louisiana
legal history have been effective against third persons from
the time of their filing, even if never recorded.3 5 But the act
32. Hill v. Hill, 4 Rob. 416 (La. 1843); Succession of Phillips, 49 La. Ann.
1019, 22 So. 202 (1897).
33. Levy v. Ford, 41 La. Ann. 873, 6 So. 671 (1889); c. Odom v. Cherokee
Homes, Inc., 165 So.2d 855 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writs denied, 246 La. 867, 167
So.2d 677 (1964).
34. Until Act 215 of 1910 was passed the law was apparently settled that
the use of the word "record" in a statute meant actual inscription, and,
under this jurisprudence, article 3342 of the Louisiana Civil Code, providing
that mortgages must be Inscribed on the records to affect third parties,
was interpreted by practitioners to mean that a mortgage was only effective
against third persons after it was actually inscribed in the mortgage office
of the parish where the property was located.
35. See, e.g., Burgas v. Stoutz, 174 La. 586, 141 So. 67 (1932); Schneidau v.
New Orleans Land Co., 132 La. 264, 61 So. 225 (1913); Note, 25 LA. L. REv.
783 (1955).
1973]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
contains possible constitutional objections, because the Louisiana
constitution provides that "[n]o mortgage or privilege on im-
movable property ... shall affect third persons unless recorded
or registered in the parish where the property is situated, in
the manner and within the time prescribed by law . . . ."85 In
the two major cases that have interpreted and applied R.S.
9:5141, the courts have attempted to reconcile the statute's
ranking provisions with the constitutional requirements by inter-
preting the statute to mean that the mortgage is effective from
the time of filing in the mortgage office, provided that it is
"promptly and actually" subsequently recorded, so that the actual
recordation in the mortgage office books makes the efficacy
retroactive to the date, hour and minute when the act was
filed for recordation31 Thus, in the situation of the ordinary
conventional mortgage, where the debt is either in existence or
comes into existence at the same time as the execution of the
mortgage, the mortgage is effective as to third persons from the
time that the act of mortgage is filed for recordation, provided
that it is thereafter promptly and actually recorded in the mort-
gage books. Since the general rule for ranking purposes is "first
in time, first in rank," it is fairly easy to determine ranking
priorities among ordinary conventional mortgages.3 The col-
lateral mortgage departs from this ranking scheme and, it must
be admitted, contains significant elements of uncertainty. Unlike
the ordinary conventional mortgage, the rank of the collateral
mortgage cannot be determined by examination of the public
records. Except for the fact that filing and recordation are
essential for the mortgage to be effective as to third persons
at all, neither filing nor recordation time determines rank; it is
the date' of issuance (or reissuance) of the "ne varietur" note
•36. LA. CoNsT. art. XIX, § 19.
37. Klnnebrew v. Tri-Con Prod. Corp., 224 La. 879, 154 So.2d 433 (1963)
(mortgage actually inscribed three days after filing for recordation held
effective from time of filing); Opelousas Fin. Co. v. Reddell, 119 So. 770
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1929) (failure of clerk to record mortgage act in the book
of mortgages for a year and a half after filing, held not "prompt and
actual" so that mortgage not effective until actually recorded). What con-
stitutes "prompt and actual" lies somewhere, then, between three days, which
is prompt, and a year and a half, which is not.
38. Parties can, of course, contractually agree to subordinate one mort-
gage to another, and thereby alter the ranking otherwise afforded by the
public records. But the general rule nonetheless holds, and a person exam-
ining the public records can determine with a high degree of precision
where a given encumbrance will rank vis-&-vis other ordinary conventional
mortgages.
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identified with the mortgage that determines the ranking of the
collateral mortgage.
"The lien is regarded as being suspended insofar as third
persons are concerned during any period in which the
note remains unissued in the possession of the mortgagor or
during any period between the extinguishment of a debt
which the note is pledged to secure, and is repledged as
security for another debt. The lien of the mortgage revives
upon the repledge of the note and dates from that day."89
The terms "issuance" and "reissuance" are, of course, terms of
art, referring respectively to the first and subsequent pledges
of the "ne varietur" note as collateral to secure the hand note.
Even if the act of collateral mortgage is recorded, so that it
could have effect against third parties, if the "ne varietur" note
has not been issued (i.e., pledged to secure a hand note), then
the mortgage lien remains suspended or dormant and any inter-
vening creditors will prime the subsequent creditor who takes
a pledge of the collateral mortgage note. The earlier recorda-
tion date of the collateral mortgage does not protect him. Sim-
ilarly, if the act of collateral mortgage has been recorded and
the "ne varietur" note has been issued (i.e., pledged to secure
a hand note), and the hand note secured by pledge of the "ne
varietur" note is paid and the "ne varietur" note returned to the
maker, the collateral mortgage again becomes dormant. Although
the collateral mortgage (unlike the ordinary conventional mort-
gage) may be revived and the "ne varietur" note may be reissued
to secure other debts of the mortgagor, nonetheless in such case
the collateral mortgage loses its former rank and the lien of the
mortgage revives upon the reissuance (i.e., repledge) of the
collateral mortgage note and dates and ranks from the time
of reissuance. Since hand notes and pledges are not recorded,
it is obviously impossible to tell from the public records whether
the collateral mortgage is dormant or viable and if viable, its
rank.
The problem of ranking from issuance or reissuance of the
"ne varietur" note by its pledge is graphically illustrated in
39. Odom v. Cherokee Homes, Inc., 165 So.2d 855, 865 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
writs denied, 246 La. 867, 167 So.2d 677 (1964). See also the cases cited In
Odom, 165 So.2d at 865, and Note, 25 LA. I Rav. 789, 794 n.33.
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Odom v. Cherokee Homes, Inc.40 Cherokee was indebted to Mor-
gan for $114,000, which sum was secured by the pledge of four
collateral mortgage notes in the aggregate face amount of $220,-
000. The four acts of collateral mortgage had already been
recorded and the notes issued when Cherokee later executed
and recorded other mortgages on the same property. Odom
advanced $120,000, part of which paid Cherokee Homes' indebted-
ness to Morgan. Cherokee then pledged the four collateral mort-
gage notes to Odom to secure Cherokee's promissory note to
Odom for $120,000. Later, Odom instituted proceedings to en-
force the collateral mortgages, and the various holders of the
notes that were secured by the subsequently recorded mort-
gages (but granted prior to the "reissuance" of the four col-
lateral mortgage notes to Odom) intervened and asserted prior-
ity over Odom. It is unclear what actually transpired in the
attorney's office when Morgan was paid off and when Odom
obtained the four collateral mortgage notes, but it is clear
that Odom did not lend funds to Cherokee directly and have
Cherokee pay off Morgan. It appears that on March 24, 1959,
in the office of Morgan's attorney, Odom delivered two checks
to Morgan's attorney, one payable to Morgan for $114,000 and
the other payable to certain trustees for $6,000. In return,
Odom received the four collateral mortgage notes. On the same
day, Cherokee executed and delivered to Odom a hand note
for $120,000, secured by pledge of the four collateral mortgage
notes. There was no evidence to indicate what happened to the
hand note, if in fact there ever was a hand note, held by Morgan
and secured by the first pledge of the four collateral mortgage
notes. In any event, if such a hand note or notes did exist, it
or they were not assigned by Morgan to Odom. Nevertheless,
Odom contended that the transaction was a "purchase" by him
of the collateral held by Morgan. The intervenors contended that
the transaction was a loan by Odom to Cherokee, with which
Cherokee repaid its indebtedness to Morgan. The court properly
found that Odom was acting for Cherokee when he paid Morgan
and received the collateral, as a result of which the debt of
Cherokee to Morgan was extinguished.
Odom could not have purchased the collateral mortgage
40. 165 So.2d 855 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writs denied, 246 La. 867, 167 So.2d
677 (1964).
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notes, because Morgan did not own the collateral mortgage notes
but held them in pledge as security for Cherokee's indebtedness
to him; obviously, Morgan could not sell something he did not
own. 41 Furthermore, Odom was "hoisted by his own petard"
because he filed suit as pledgee of the collateral mortgage notes,
a position obviously inconsistent with the contention that he had
purchased them. What Odom should have purchased was the
primary indebtedness. Thus, if there had been hand notes as
evidence of the primary indebtedness, and Odom had purchased
the hand notes, then the primary indebtedness would have been
transferred to him, and that transfer would have carried with
it the pledged collateral. But, as observed earlier, there was
no evidence to indicate that there ever were any hand notes
representing Cherokee's indebtedness to Morgan, and clearly
none was transferred to Odom. The court, finding that there was
not a purchase of the primary indebtedness, but rather that the
debt of Cherokee to Morgan was extinguished, found it im-
material whether the collateral mortgage notes were delivered
to Cherokee and then delivered by Cherokee to Odom. Since
pledge is an accessorial obligation and cannot exist without a
primary obligation,42 when the debt of Cherokee to Morgan was
paid, Morgan's pledge obviously ceased to exist. The court
properly found that at that instant "the pledged mortgage notes
constructively came into the hands of the corporation."43 That
being the case, the subsequent repledge of the collateral mort-
gage notes by Cherokee, as security for the $120,000 note that it
gave to Odom, constituted a "reissuance" of the notes by Chero-
kee Homes, with the inevitable result that the lien of the collat-
eral mortgage ranked from the date of reissuance and repledge
of the notes to Odom, and not from the dates of the original
issuances to Morgan.
The -jurisprudence has not exactly been littered with cases
involving collateral mortgages, and while Odom clearly illus-
trates an example of extinction of one obligation and reissuance
of the "ne varietur" notes so as to establish a later ranking
41. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2452, 3165. Of course, If the principal obligation
had been due, and the act of pledge authorized a private sale of the col-
lateral, then Morgan could have disposed of the pledged collateral. See LA.
Civ. CODE art. 3158. However, since the primary obligation of Cherokee to
Morgan was not in default, Morgan could not sell the pledged collateral.
42. L&. Civ. CODE art. 1771.
43. 165 So.2d 855 at 865.
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date, what actually constitutes "reissuance" has not been fully
clarified. Until 1972, for example, it was not determined whether,
when M pledges his "ne varietur" note to P to secure a hand
note and M subsequently pays the debt to P in full, but P retains
the "ne varietur" note and subsequently advances more funds
and M executes additional hand notes, such subsequent advances
constitute "reissuance." In 1952, to remove some of the uncer-
tainty as to ranking intervening encumbrances and such prob-
lems of "reissuance," the legislature enacted Act 290, which
amended Civil Code article 3158 to provide in part:
"[I]t is further provided that whenever a pledge of any
instrument or item of the kind listed in this article is made
to secure a particular loan or debt, or to secure advances
to be made up to a certain amount, and, if so desires or
provided, to secure any other obligations or liabilities of the
pledger to the pledgee, then existing or thereafter arising,
up to the limit of the pledge, and the pledged instrument
or item remains and has remained in the hands of the
pledgee, the instrument or item may remain in pledge to
the pledgee or, without withdrawal from the hands of the
pledgee, be repledged to the pledgee to secure at any time
any renewal or renewals of the original loan or any part
thereof, or any new or additional loans, even though the
original loan has been reduced or paid, up to the total limit
which it was agreed should be secured by the pledge, and
if so desired or provided, to secure any other obligations
or liabilities of the pledger to the pledgee, then existing or
thereafter arising, up to the limit of the pledge, without any
added notification or other formality, and the pledge shall
be valid as well against third persons as against the pledger
thereof, if made in good faith; . . ."
Commenting on the amendment to article 3158, Harry Sachse
observed in 1967 that "[I]f the statute is to be given effect,
pledge, whether involving a collateral mortgage or not, can
now freely be used to secure future advances, obligatory or not.
The date for ranking will be the date of the pledge, not the
date of the advance. '24 4
44. Sachse, Report to the Lou4ana Law Institute on Article Nine of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 41 TUL. L. REV. 785, 798-99 (1967).
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In 1972 the amendment was interpreted for the first time,
and in New Orleans Silversmiths, Inc. v. Toups,45 a Louisiana
court held that article 3158 of the Louisiana Civil Code, as
amended to authorize the "open-end" pledge, applies to the
collateral mortgage situation, so that where subsequent advances
are made by the same creditor, the subsequent advances rank
from and relate back to the date of the initial issuance (i.e.,
pledge) of the "ne varietur" note to that creditor. 4 The decision,
legally correct and commercially sound, not only clarifies this
previously unresolved area but immeasurably strengthens the
collateral mortgage as a flexible security device. In Silversmiths,
the mortgagor executed the first collateral mortgage, in the
amount of $150,000 on June 16, 1967, but the "ne varietur" note
was not pledged until six days later, on June 22, 1967, when
it was pledged to the Hibernia National Bank to secure a hand
note for $75,000. Over one year later, the mortgagor executed
a second collateral mortgage, in the amount of $50,000, dated
October 16, 1968, and on the same day the "ne varietur" note
for the second collateral mortgage was pledged to New Orleans
Silversmiths to secure a hand note representing a $35,000 loan.
Less than one month later, a corporation bearing the same name
as the mortgagor borrowed $30,000 from the Hibernia National
Bank and the mortgagor personally endorsed the note represent-
ing the loan to the corporation. Later the same month, the cor-
poration borrowed an additional $35,000 from the Hibernia Na-
tional Bank, and again the mortgagor personally endorsed the
loan. Then, in December of 1968, the mortgagor, individually, re-
newed his original $75,000 loan made on June 22, 1967. The loans
were variously renewed, by execution of new notes, and ulti-
mately in May and June of 1969, all of the prior loans of the mort-
gagor were consolidated and the "ne varietur" note paraphed for
identification with the first collateral mortgage (June 16, 1967)
was pledged to secure the consolidation of the prior loans. Using
letter symbols, then, the classic hypothesis that law professors
posited to twit their students, and the classic situation that
plagued bank attorneys, was finally posed for resolution in the
courts: D borrowed money from A, secured by pledge of col-
lateral mortgage notes, and subsequently D borrowed money
45. 261 So.2d 252 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 262 La. 309, 263 So.2d
47 (1972), noted in 47 TUL. L. REv. 211 (1972).
46. Id. at 254.
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from B secured by a second and subsequently recorded collat-
eral mortgage note; then, D paid off his loan to A and later
borrowed more money from A, presumptively securing the sub-
sequent advances from A by the pledge of the original collateral
mortgage note. Was this a "reissuance"? If so, upon payment
of the first advances, the lien of the mortgage was lost and it
obtained a new ranking upon the reissuance. Or, did article 3158
govern so that as long as the same creditor made all of the
advances and retained the "ne varietur" note, all of the advances
related back to the original issuance? Or, thirdly, did article
3158 relate back to protect the initial creditor only to the extent
of advances it had made up to the time of the intervening
encumbrance?
New Orleans Silversmiths foreclosed on the October, 1968
second collateral mortgage, and at the foreclosure proceedings,
the Hibernia Bank intervened and asserted its priority. Silver-
smiths admitted that it ranked behind the initial advance of
$75,000 by the Hibernia, dated June 22, 1967, which was the
time when the first collateral mortgage became effective, but
Silversmiths claimed priority over all other advances. The court
first looked to the predicate of article 3158, which requires that
there be a written pledge, delivery of the object in pledge, and
good faith. Finding that the pledge was in writing, and that
there had been delivery of the collateral (the "ne varietur"
collateral mortgage note) to the creditor, and that the parties
were in good faith, the court held that under the provisions of
article 3158, the lien rights of the Hibernia National Bank
reverted to June 22, 1967, the date of the first issuance of the
June 16, 1967, collateral mortgage, and that all advances made
by the Hibernia subsequent to that initial issuance, even though
made after the October, 1968 mortgage and after the advances
by New Orleans Silversmiths, nonetheless primed the October,
1968 mortgage held by Silversmiths.4 7
Judge Lemmon dissented from the majority opinion, ex-
pressing the view that the collateral mortgage first became
effective only to the extent of $75,000, the amount of the initial
loan, and that the mortgage did not become effective against
third parties in an amount over $75,000 until a point in time
47. Id. at 256.
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after Silversmiths' mortgage had been inscribed in the mortgage
records and had already taken effect itself.4 In his view article
3158, which is an article for the ranking of pledges, is not an
article which should rank mortgages. Noting that the thing
pledged is the "ne varietur" note and not the land, Judge Lem-
mon then observed that the pledge would give a ranking pref-
erence on the note and not on land. The initial advance of
$75,000, as the "limit of the pledge" contemplated by article 3158,
was the effective limit of the debt that was secured by the thing
pledged, namely the "ne varietur" note. In other words, since the
mortgage itself was not effective against third parties for more
than $75,000 at the time of the intervening encumbrance, the note
secured by the mortgage, namely the "ne varietur" note, which
is the "thing pledged," could not be effective to a greater extent.
The problem with the dissenting opinion, we suggest, is that
it fails to take into account the hybrid nature of the collateral
mortgage and its total character as a security device. The "ne
varietur" note was paraphed for identification with a collateral
mortgage up to the amount of $150,000 even though it was
pledged initially to secure a first advance of only $75,000. Sup-
pose that instead of using a collateral mortgage note, the pledgor
had pledged 1,000 shares of common stock of a company listed
on the New York Stock Exchange, worth $150,000, to secure a
loan of $75,000; then under Judge Lemmon's views in dissent, if
the pledgee subsequently advanced an additional $75,000, he
would only be secured up to the sum of $75,000, the initial
advance. Article 3158 confers retrospective ranking to future
advances back to the date of the initial pledge "up to the limit
of the pledge." And one must not confuse "the limit of the
pledge" with the "initial advance." Since one meaning of the
word "pledge" is the very collateral itself that is pledged, one
interpretive approach could be to look to the collateral itself.
Whether the amount of the indebtedness is greater than or less
than the value of the collateral, the privilege conferred by the
pledge covers all of the collateral originally pledged, or in the
example given, to all 1,000 shares (despite any fluctuations in
their value). The one thousand shares could be considered the
"limit of the pledge." But Judge Lemmon's view would result
in affording retrospective ranking effectively to only one-half
48. Id.
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of the collateral, or 500 shares. And the view is not in accord
with the literal terms of article 3158, which provide that any
additional loans and advances made even though the original
loan has been reduced or paid "shall be secured by the collateral
to the same extent as if they came into existence when the
instrument or item was originally pledged."4 9
One should not, however, summarily dismiss Judge Lem-
mon's view in dissent that article 3158 does not rank mortgages
(and hence does not rank the collateral mortgage). Article 3158
is in fact located in the section of the Civil Code on pledge and is
a pledge-ranking article. A major part of the problem stems from
the ambiguity in the phrase "up to the limit of the pledge" in
article 3158, as the phrase is applied to collateral mortgages.
The word "pledge" has several different meanings and usages
in the Civil Code, which, of course, does not add to clarity. The
word "pledge" is both a noun and a verb, and in the Code it
refers both to the contract of pledge itself and to the collateral
given as security under the contract.60 The problem becomes
more difficult because, while article 3158 twice refers to "the
limit of the pledge," it also provides that, even if the loan is
reduced or paid, the pledgee has the benefit of retrospective
ranking "up to the total limit which it was agreed should be
secured by the pledge." Pretermitting the collateral mort-
gage situation, and applying article 3158 to an ordinary open-
end pledge, as, for example, a loan secured by pledge of cor-
porate stock, the initial agreement of pledge (which could be
an authentic act, an act under private signature, or even a hand
note containing pledge provisions) might very well set the
"limit of the pledge." Where future advances are contemplated,
the agreement of pledge should contain a statement reflecting
the intention of the parties in that regard. For the pledge creditor
to obtain the "privilege" on the collateral and preference against
third parties that pledge confers, the first paragraph of article
3158 requires that there be a "written instrument" that states
"the amount of the debt intended to be secured thereby" and a
description of the thing pledged. In an ordinary open-end pledge
49. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3158, as amended by La. Acts of 1952, No. 290.
50. R. SLOVENKO, TREATISE ON CREDITOR'S RIGHTS UNDER LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
101 (1968).
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situation, careful practice would dictate stating the upper limit
of future advances in the initial agreement of pledge.51
But the collateral mortgage device is neither fully pledge
nor fully mortgage. One must remember that it is a hybrid
and to be effective it must employ both security devices. In
the collateral mortgage, pledge and mortgage are inextricably
bound together, since the device requires the pledge of a mort-
gage note. Without an act of mortgage, there can be no mortgage
note; without a mortgage note, there is no collateral to be
pledged; without the pledge of the note, the mortgage is dormant
and there is no obligation secured by the mortgage. As the very
name implies, the device contemplates that the mortgage note
does not represent an actual debt but will be issued as collateral
to secure such debts. And the ranking priorities of collateral
mortgages are not geared to filing and recordation, as in the
ordinary conventional mortgage, but rather to "issuance," i.e.,
pledge of the "ne varietur" note. Consequently, the only com-
mercially reasonable way to view article 3158 as applied to the
collateral mortgage device is to view "the limit of the pledge"
as being the limit fixed by the act of collateral mortgage. From
the inception, that amount is the amount up to which the mort-
gage can secure debts. The hand note represents merely the
first advance in what might be a single advance situation or
what might be a series of advances. The language used in the
act of collateral mortgage expresses the intention to pledge and
sets the total limit that can be secured by the pledge.52 Thus,
in the unique situation of the collateral mortgage, odd as it may
be, it is literally the act of mortgage that fixes the "limit of
the pledge." The key to applying article 3158 to the collateral
mortgage situation, which the authors submit is commercially
51. In this connection, article 3158 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides
in part as follows: "[W]henever a pledge of any instrument . . . is made to
secure a particular loan or debt, or to secure advances to be made up to a
certain amount, and, if so desire to provide it, to secure any other obliga-
tions or liabilities of the pledger to the pledgee, then existing or thereafter
arising, up to the limit of the pledge, and the pledged instrument or item
remains and has remained in the hands of the pledgee, the instrument
or item may remain in pledge to the pledgee or, without withdrawal from
the hands of the pledgee, be repledged to the pledgee to secure at any
time any renewal or renewals of the original loan or any pledge thereof
or any new or additional loans, even though the original loan has been
reduced or paid, up to the total limit which it was agreed could be secured
by the pledge, . . ." (Emphasis added.)
52. Bee note 13 supra.
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sound and legally correct, is to view the collateral mortgage
device as a whole. As Justice Tate observed when the Louisiana
supreme court denied writs in Silversmiths, one must take into
consideration the jurisprudential development of the device
based upon the pledge of the collateral mortgage note.58
If the court had held otherwise than it did in Silversmiths,
the holding would have emasculated article 3158, and it would,
of course, have significantly weakened the utility of the collateral
mortgage to secure fluctuating loan amounts. Obviously, the fact
that a mortgage is executed in the amount of $150,000 does not
mean that, at a forced sale, the property covered by the mort-
gage will in fact produce proceeds of $150,000. A mortgage may
be for an amount less than the fair market value of the property
covered by the mortgage, or it might well be greater. Similarly,
stock or other securities may be pledged when the fair market
value is $150,000, but at the time of default on the loan, the
stock may well be worth substantially less than that amount,
or it may well be worth more. Thus, it would be futile to look
to the "value" of the "ne varietur" note. The act of collateral
mortgage sets a ceiling on the amount of the security device,
as a mortgage on the land, but the actual indebtedness may
be less or more than that amount. The key, of course, is that
the collateral mortgage employs the pledging of mortgage notes
to secure advances, and, under article 3158, after the initial
pledge, all such advances by the same creditor relate back to
the date of the first pledge to him and are secured by the same
collateral (which in Silversmiths was a collateral mortgage up
to $150,000).
The commercial advantage of the decision is obvious: once
the creditor has made an initial advance, secured by pledge
of a collateral mortgage "ne varietur" note, he can safely there-
after make advances, and the debtor can reduce or even pay
the loan in full, and additional advances may be made even
after such partial reductions or full payment, with the creditor
nonetheless retaining throughout the loan period the initial
53. 262 La. 309, 263 So.2d 47 (1972). A similar approach Is taken by
Professor Gerald LeVan in an excellent analysis of the Silversmiths deci-
sion. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972 Term-
Security Devices, 33 LA. L. REV. 228 (1973). He concludes by applauding the
result as bringing "a new measure of comfort" to practitioners accustomed
to the collateral mortage. Id. at 233.
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ranking date of the first advance. This priority relieves the
creditor of the necessity of checking the public records each
time an advance is to be made, as well as saving the parties
additional paper work, time and expense. The major objection
to the retrospective ranking afforded by article 3158 is the pos-
sibility of abuse and injury to innocent third parties. This kind
of objection, even if valid, is best remedied by the legislature
and not the courts since the terms of Act 290 of 1952, amending
article 3158 and authorizing the "open-end" pledge, clearly apply
to the collateral mortgage situation. But more important, the
specific criticism ignores the fact that several bases must be
touched before the retrospective protection afforded by article
3158 even comes into play: (1) the initial pledge must be
properly confected, with the parties mutually agreeing at the
time that the pledge will secure obligations or liabilities there-
after arising; (2) each succeeding loan must be specifically
secured by a pledge of the original collateral; (3) the collateral
must continuously remain in the hands of the pledgee; and (4)
the parties must act in good faith at all times. If the creditor
has complied with these prerequisites, then no "innocent" third
party can be injured by the collateral mortgage any more than
he can be injured by the ordinary mortgage to secure future
advances. Since the act of collateral mortgage is recorded and
part of the public records (an essential element of the mort-
gage's efficacy as to third parties), any third party who relies
on the public records would know not only of the existence of
the collateral mortgage, but would have full knowledge of its
upper limit. Granted, a party examining the public records
cannot know the exact amount of the debt, but the same can
be said of the ordinary conventional mortgage; and any party
examining the public records does know the ceiling of the
collateral mortgage.
The most serious functional disadvantage of the collateral
mortgage, as it is now used, is that the mortgage is invariably
made in favor of a nominal party or any future holder or holders
of the mortgage note (the nominal party generally being a
secretary in the notary's office) so that a person examining
the public records does not know who the lender actually is,
i.e., who holds the hand note. The public records do reveal the
name of the notary public, however, who can easily be asked
1973]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
for whose account the collateral mortgage was executed and
who usually will be able to direct the third party to the present
lender. Furthermore, the third party must know the name of
the mortgagor and it is virtually inconceivable that the mort-
gagor will not know either who actually has possession of the
"ne varietur" note or at least how he can be located.5 4
DISTINCTION FROM ORDINARY MORTGAGE TO SECURE
FuTURE ADVANCES
Because the collateral mortgage is commonly used to secure
future advances, it is frequently confused with the "mortgage
to secure future advances." 55 The Civil Code expressly authorizes
a mortgage to be given for an obligation that is not yet in
existence, 6 or in other words, a future obligation, and the Code
provides that the rights of the mortgagee are realized only
insofar as the promise is carried into effect., But, if the parties
contemplate future advances, and the future advances are in
fact made, then the Code provides that the mortgage has a
retroactive effect to the time of the contract." The classic ex-
ample of the ordinary mortgage to secure future advances is
the agreement of a lending institution to advance funds in con-
nection with the construction of a building; for example, home-
stead A agrees to advance $50,000 for the construction of a house
on property belonging to B, where B has entered into a building
contract for the construction of the house by contractor C. The
building contract provides for stage payments to the contractor,
as the slab is poured, the roof constructed, the electrical and
plumbing roughed in, and so forth. Homestead A agrees that
it will advance the funds and make payments to the contractor
54. An ordinary conventional mortgage note pledged to "bearer" can
be transferred by delivery, so one would not necessarily know the name
of the holder of such a note from the face of the public records in this
situation either. But no one suggests abolishing mortgages altogether or
doing away with bearer notes as a result.
55. For example, Judge Regan, in his dissenting opinion in the court
of appeal decision in Thrift Funds Canal, Inc. v. Foy, 242 So.2d 253, 257
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1971), states that "the Louisiana mortgage to secure
future obligations is commonly referred to by the practitioner as a 'collateral
mortgage' ....... Other writers have similarly confused the two mortgages.
56. LA. Civ. COD art. 3292.
57. LA. CXv. CODs art. 3293.
58. 1d. This undoubtedly means to the time of filing, if actually and
promptly recorded, and not to the date of the act of mortgage, since the
mortgage could not be effective as to third parties without filing.
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as the various stages are met and certified as having been com-
pleted. Homestead A may take a mortgage on B's property at
the same time that it commits itself to advance funds for the
construction of the house. Of course, there is special legislation
in addition to the Code to govern such a situation.' 9 As each
stage is completed by contractor C, homestead A advances to
him the funds for that stage, and under the provisions of articles
3292 and 3293 of the Civil Code, the advances made by the
homestead are secured by the mortgage originally granted and
each advance relates back to the original date of the mortgage.
This classic example represents a mortgage to secure specific
future advances, and under the general rules of mortgages, if
the mortgage debt is reduced, the mortgage is reduced pro tanto
and cannot be thereafter increased. If the debt is paid off, such
a mortgage is extinguished and cannot be revived.
Unfortunately, the Code itself does not distinguish between
mortgages to secure specific future advances and mortgages to
secure optional or facultative future advances.O On its face,
the collateral mortgage indicates that it will be used to secure
advances to be made in the future, but it does not indicate
59. See LA. R.S. 6:833 (Supp. 1970). See ais LA. R.S. 9:5301-07 (1950);
LA. R.S. 9:4801 (c) (Supp. 1972); LA. R.S. 3:207 (1950), which deal with
ranking of various advances under pre-existing recorded security devices.
60. See, e.g., LA. Civ. CoDE art. 3292 and Pickersgill v. Brown, 7 La. Ann.
297 (1852). In Pickersgill, the mortgage apparently secured an already exist-
ing debt as well as fluctuating balances on an open account. Both French
commentators and Louisiana practitioners at one time criticized the mort-
gage to secure future advances. Some French authorities argued that if the
mortgage-creditor (the obligor) was not obligated to make the advances,
his obligation rested on a potestative condition. See id. at 307-11. See aso
F. LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 527 (1878); M. TROPLONG,
DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS §§ 477-80 (1833). Louisiana practitioners expanded this
argument by asserting that such mortgages could only become effective
upon fulfillment of the condition, i.e., the advance; therefore, the mortgage
should rank only from the advance, the point in time when the mortgage
comes into being. See, e.g., Pickersgill v. Brown, 7 La. Ann. 297, 316-17
(1852) (excerpted brief for rehearing). The French commentators who
opposed such views argued that the principal obligation was not the act
of advancing money, but the promise to advance embodied in the original
contract. See Comment, 34 TuL. L. REv. 800, 806 (1960). The redactors of the
Civil Code of 1825, by adding articles 3259 and 3260 of that Code, apparently
Intended to preclude further debate from arising In Louisiana. These
articles were retained in the Code of 1870 as articles 3292 and 3293. If the
mortgagee is not obligated to lend, however, there may still be a valid basis
for reversion to the French arguments concerning potestative conditions;
see, e.g., In re York, 30 F. Cas. 811, 812 (No. 18, 138) (C.C.D. La. 1870): "There
was from the date of the contract opening the credit account, a reciprocal
obligation. The creditor must make the promised advances, and the debtor
must restore what sums he takes by virtue of the credit."
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specific advances. Therefore, the collateral mortgage is not and
cannot be considered a mortgage to secure future advances of
the specific kind. The collateral mortgage obviously can be
and is used as a mortgage to secure future advances of the
unspecific variety, and by its very operation of pledging the
"ne varietur" note, the collateral mortgage is designed for that
purpose. But the collateral mortgage is much broader in pur-
pose and in practice than use to secure unspecified future
advances: it may, for example, be used to secure an obligation
to perform, in which event the ultimate outcome might be no
monetary debt at all. For example, the authors have used the
collateral mortgage in place of a surety bond, where a contractor
agreed to construct a building but was unable to obtain pay-
ment and performance bonds from a commercial surety. In place
of these surety bonds, the contractor executed a collateral mort-
gage on his own home, and then, by a written act of pledge,
pledged the "ne varietur" note to the owner up to a specified
penal sum to protect the owner against liability arising from
liens or failure to complete construction. As a practical matter,
in one such case the contractor defaulted on his obligation, and
after the full extent of the contractor's liability to the owner
was determined, the owner foreclosed on the collateral mort-
gage."' Thus, just as all goldfish are fish, but not all fish are
goldfish, so all collateral mortgages may secure future obliga-
tions, but not all mortgages to secure future obligations are
collateral mortgages.
The difficulty in precisely defining the mortgage to secure
future advances has been compounded by the recent Louisiana
supreme court decision in Thrift Funds Canal, Inc. v. Foy.6 2
In that case M granted a $10,000 first mortgage to A on February
14, 1963, payable in monthly installments. Three years later,
when the principal had been reduced to $8,227, M borrowed
more money from A, and at that time executed a promissory
note for $3,000, stating that "this note is secured by a mortgage
executed under date of 2-14-63, together with the said mortgage
note." More than two years later, December 19, 1968, M executed
a second mortgage in favor of B on the same property, for a
61. Smith v. Eugene, Docket No. 479187 (Civil Dist. Ct., Orleans Parish,
La.).
62. 261 La. 573, 260 So.2d 628 (1972).
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debt in excess of $16,000. At foreclosure proceedings, the court
was required to evaluate the three alleged encumbrances:
1. The 1963 $10,000 note, secured by a 1963 first mortgage.
2. The 1966 $3,000 note, a "future advance" allegedly
secured by the 1963 mortgage.
3. The 1968 $16,000 note, secured by a recorded 1968 second
mortgage.
The primary issue was whether B's second mortgage primed A's
1966 note, which was allegedly secured by the earlier mortgage.
The court of appeal held that since mortgages are strictissimi
juris and cannot be extended or modified by analogy, the mort-
gage, to qualify as a mortgage to secure future advances, must
expressly state that fact on its face.68 The court noted that
"nothing less will satisfy the security of the public records,
ownership of property, and the process of finance."" Since the
1963 mortgage did not so state on its face, it did not qualify
to secure future advances and more particularly the $3,000
advance made three years after the mortgage. The Louisiana
supreme court affirmed as to result, but for different reasons.
In affirming and reaching the right result, the supreme court
correctly noted that the 1963 mortgage could not be classified
as a collateral mortgage because the mortgage secured a specific
existing debt and possessed none of the formal characteristics
of a collateral mortgage. So far, so good; but the court then
enunciated principles that will unfortunately and undoubtedly
create more confusion than certainty and may do serious damage
to "the process of finance." The supreme court stated:
"It is true that, in order to secure a future debt, a mortgage
need not express on its face that it is given for future
advances. It may be phrased as security for an existing debt,
when no debt in fact exists, and yet secure a later debt in
accordance with the intention of the parties."8 5 (Emphasis
added.)
63. 242 So.2d 253, 256 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
64. Id. The court held that Walmsley v. Resweber, 105 La. 522, 30 So. 5
(1901) had in effect overruled Pickersgill v. Brown, 8 La. Ann. 297 (1852),
which held that a mortgage did not have to expressly state on its face
that it was designed to secure future advances.
65. 261 La. at 582-83, 260 So.2d at 631, citing Hortman-Salem Co. v. White,
168 La. 1057, 123 So. 711 (1929); Collins v. His Creditors, 18 La. Ann. 235
(1866); Pickersgill v. Brown, 7 La. Ann. 297 (1852); Note, 25 LA. L. Rxv.
789, 791 (1965).
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Notwithstanding this language, the court went on to hold:
"We find nothing in the present record, however, to show
that, when the first mortgage was executed, the parties
intended that it secure future advances. Quite to the con-
trary, the record reflects that it was designed only to secure
an existing debt, a loan made contemporaneously with the
execution of the mortgage."8 6
Thus, concluding that the 1963 mortgage was one for a specific
debt, the court properly applied the Louisiana law that "[a]fter
a mortgage note for a specific debt has been paid, the mortgage
is extinguished. No later advance on the note can revive the
mortgage."6'
Justice Hamlin dissented, believing that the 1963 mortgage
had been intended to secure additional advances, so that it could
properly be classified as a mortgage to secure future advances.6 8
Justice Dixon also dissented, stating the strongest and most
cogent reason of all:
"The majority opinion creates more problems than it solves.
It makes the rank of competing mortgages depend on the
mental state of the parties at the time the oldest mortgage
is executed . . . . Our holding implies that these loans are
unsecured in the absence of parol evidence to establish the
intent of the parties at the time the mortgage was exe-
cuted." 9
The authors submit that the result reached in the case
is correct, because the 1963 mortgage was clearly for a specific
debt, having a "ne varietur" note that was payable in equal
monthly installments, whereby the payment of each installment
applied to accrued interest and reduced the principal pro tanto,
and the funds were advanced at the time of the mortgage. On
its face, the mortgage appeared to be for a specific, particular,
66. 216 La. at 584, 260 So.2d at 632.
67. Id. at 585, 260 So.2d at 632, cititg LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3285, 3411 (4);
Baton Rouge Wood Prod. Inc. v. Ezell, 251 La. 369, 204 So.2d 295 (1967);
LaCoste v. Hickey, 203 La. 794, 14 So.2d 639 (1943); Mente & Co. v. Levy,
160 La. 496, 107 So.2d 318 (1926); Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Succession of
Gragar, 109 La. 677, 33 So. 728 (1903).
68. 261 La. at 586, 260 So.2d at 633.
69. Id. at 603-04, 260 So.2d at 639.
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existing debt, so that partial payment of the mortgage install-
ment note reduced the note pro tanto; as the debt was reduced,
it could not thereafter be increased to prejudice junior mort-
gages.70
Unless it is legislatively overruled or judicially reversed,
Thrift Funds may completely vitiate any efficacy of the Public
Records Doctrine as applied to ranking of mortgages. The deci-
sion lends itself to the interpretation that any mortgage on the
public records may be a mortgage to secure future advances.
Before or after Thrift Funds, there is no problem in identifying
a collateral mortgage, which shows on its face that it is clearly
intended as such. Nor should there be any problem in identify-
ing the classic mortgage to secure future advances where the
advances are specific and/or obligatory, as in the example given
above of the homestead agreeing to advance funds as stages in
construction are met. But for a century there has been a single
case, Pickersgill v. Brown,71 studied religiously by generations
of law students, which in a truncated opinion had stated in
dictum that a mortgage need not state on its face that it is
executed to secure future advances. The case has been con-
tinuously criticized, in opinions and in the legal literature, and
it was arguable that it had been overruled by Walmsley v.
Resweber.72 The point was, of course, arguable. No careful prac-
titioner relied on Pickersgill as sound law, but it was, admit-
tedly, comforting to have the dictum to fall back upon in the
70. LA. Cv. CODE art. 3377; Boagnl v. Wartelle, 50 La. Ann. 128, 23 So. 206
(1897); Schinkel v. Hanewinkel, 19 La. Ann. 260 (1867).
71. 7 La. Ann. 297 (1852). In Pickersgill, a standard mortgage to secure
future advances was given for a past Indebtedness, a present loan, and
future advances. An intervenor held another mortgage given after the
first mortgage was recorded, but before all of the advances secured by it
were made. The court held that the first mortgage primed the Intervenor's
mortgage because mortgages, under the hypothecary system of Louisiana,
may be given to secure debts having no legal existence at the date of the
mortgage. Id. at 307, 314. The court stated In dictum that even with respect
to third parties, the mortgage need not express on its face that it is
executed to secure future advances. Id. at 307. Pickersgill has been upheld
even in recent years. See Courshon v. Mauroner-Craddock, Inc., 219 So.2d 258
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 253 La. 760, 219 So.2d 788 (1969).
72. 105 La. 522, 30 So. 5 (1901). In Walmsley, a collateral mortgage for
$3,000 secured six $500 notes made payable to the mortgagor himself, who
endorsed and pledged the notes as he ran up debts. The court held that the
mortgage did not secure future advances because it did not state on its face
that it was given for that purpose. The effect of this holding was that the
mortgage ranked not from recordation, but from issuance of the separate
notes.
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event of trouble. While legal scholars debate over whether
Walmsley v. Resweber did in fact overrule Pickersgill v. Brown,
the authors respectfully submit that the court in Thrift Funds
had an excellent opportunity to hold that the dicum in Pickersgill
was overruled. Had it done so, the court would have created
little or no hardship to scriveners drafting mortgages and at the
same time the rule would add a desirable element of certainty
and security to the Public Records Doctrine in this area. The
better rule was stated in Walmsley as follows:
"True it is that between mortgagor and mortgagee a mort-
gage may be executed for advances to be made, and it may
be that, as between them, although the mortgage does not
contain the stipulation that it should regarding future ad-
vances, it may yet be construed to embrace them as a con-
sideration; but, as between a transferee of a mortgage and
a third person, the former cannot establish by parole a con-
sideration not even hinted at in the act of mortgage, or in
any writing. ' s
It has been suggested that the Thrift Funds rule, upholding
Pickersgill and authorizing a mortgage to secure future advances
even though it contains no references to such advances, is com-
mercially necessary.74 It strikes the authors as incongruous to
complain "of the serious functional disadvantages" of the col-
lateral mortgage, and at the same time attempt to justify the
rule that any mortgage can be a mortgage to secure future
advances if the parties only intended it to be so.7 5 One must
ask: how does any third party examining the public records
know what the original parties intended? The case will surely
73. 105 La. at 533, 30 So. at 10. LA. Civ. CODE art. 3290. For a general dis-
cussion of the conventional mortgage, see R. SLOVENKo, TREATISE ON CREDITORS'
RIGHTS UNDER LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 558-81 (1968).
74. It Is reputed that a large number of presently outstanding loans
are secured by mortgages given and recorded long before such loans were
made, and that the mortgage instruments contain no references to the
mortgagor's intent to secure future advances thereby. Although Thrift Funds
has been affirmed, one prominent author suggests that such loans may be
unsecured. He also contends that requiring the mortgage to recite that it
secures future advances will not assist third persons in determining the
amount of indebtedness secured by the mortgage at any given time. The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1970-1971 Term-Security
Devices, 32 LA. L,. REV. 233, 238, 240 (1972).
75. Like Humpty Dumpty, the mortgagee can say that when he uses a
mortgage it means what he wants it to mean, nothing more and nothing
less.
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encourage creditors to attempt to lift themselves by their own
bootstraps: any creditor who advances future funds after the
mortgage can be expected to claim that the original intent was
that the mortgage secure future advances; otherwise, he would
not have made the future advances. Nor, we submit, would any
great hardship be created if attorneys were required to insert
a clause in the mortgage stating that the mortgage is designed
to secure future advances. Instead, by virtually requiring, much
less permitting, the use of parole evidence to vary written instru-
ments regarding immovables, the court has introduced a kind
of "Ouija board jurisprudence" and made the public records
meaningless. Professor LeVan, in speaking of ordinary conven-
tional mortgages to secure future advances, suggests, "to be
safe, it will still be necessary to assume that the maximum
indebtedness recited in the mortgage is presently outstanding."76
His statement is not broad enough: under the Thrift Funds rule,
it will now be necessary to make that assumption for virtually
every mortgage on the public records.
The authors suggest that the rule of Pickersgill v. Brown,
now upheld in Thrift Funds Canal, Inc. v. Foy, is an unfortunate
rule and should be legislatively overruled. The reluctance to
jurisprudentially overrule Pickersgill perhaps stems from the
problem of possible retrospective effect of such a decision, there-
by creating problems for mortgages that were executed in
reliance on Pickersgill. Legislatively overruling Thrift Funds
can make the rule apply prospectively only. Since the mortgage
to secure future advances has a retrospective ranking (to the
date of filing and recordation) that is superior to the ranking
afforded collateral mortgages (based on "issuance"), it appears
patently inequitable to permit virtually any mortgage to qualify
as a mortgage to secure future advances, even if the mortgage
does not so state on its face that it is so intended, and thereby
obtain the earlier ranking date, but to deny that advantage to
the collateral mortgage, which does show on its face that it
will secure advances to be made in the future.
ADVANTAGES OF THE COLLATERAL MORTGAGE
Despite the alleged "serious functional disadvantages" of
76. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1970-1971 Term-
Security Devices, 32 LA. L. REv. 233, 240 (1972).
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the collateral mortgage, the authors suggest that the collateral
mortgage has numerous excellent functional advantages that
would not be afforded creditors or debtors under a strict system
of ordinary conventional mortgages for specific debts and ordi-
nary conventional mortgages for specific future debts. Nor are
the functional disadvantages that "serious." Inability to deter-
mine the identity of the mortgagee from the public records
hardly appears to be a problem, since the same can be true of
any mortgage, if the mortgagee merely transfers the note; at
best, all that the public records can indicate is the identity of
the initial mortgagee. Nor does it seem disadvantageous that
the amount of the true indebtedness secured by the mortgage
cannot be ascertained by examining the public records; no sys-
tem in the civil law or the common law has the payment sched-
ule on mortgages reflected on the public records, and the public
records could not be expected to show how many installments
have been paid, or how much reduction of principal has been
made on the demand note. In other words, the function of the
public records is to put third parties on notice of the fact that
there is an encumbrance, and inscription of the mortgage
does provide that information. It shows the ceiling, but it can-
not be expected to show where one stands between the floor and
the ceiling, nor can it be expected to show whether a note has
prescribed or otherwise been extinguished. No system of laws
can prevent an individual from attempting to defraud someone
else if he wants to attempt fraud, but the fears that the collateral
mortgage lends itself to efforts to defraud one's creditors seem
unwarranted to the authors, because the very predicate of article
3158 is that the dealings must be "in good faith."
Finally, it hardly seems objectionable that a competing
creditor should not be permitted to prime advances that the
mortgagee makes after he receives actual knowledge of the per-
fection of the competing creditor's claims. Often it is the knowl-
edge that he can safely make such future advances without fear
of being primed by an intervening creditor that induces the
mortgagee to enter into the credit transaction and make the
initial advance. Both the borrower and the lender may make
substantial commitments to numerous other parties, such as
architects, engineers, contractors, investors, and so forth, in
reliance on the loan commitment, and those parties in turn rely
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on their commitments. But the fact that future advances may
be definitely contemplated does not mean that the debts and
amounts are definite. One reason the collateral mortgage is so
useful is that it is the only safe security device when the bor-
rower does not know at the outset the exact amounts of, or dates
when, money will be needed. In the construction of large sub-
divisions, one rarely knows the time elements for completion
of construction of the various units, nor the exact amounts of
money that will be needed as there is development and sale and
rental of properties; the collateral mortgage offers economy
and flexibility to the borrower with relatively complete security
to the creditor. In the simple example of the construction of a
house, the homestead that agrees to advance funds in stage
payments as the house is constructed would find itself in a most
precarious situation if only half the funds had been advanced
and the house was only half completed when an intervening
creditor came into the picture, if the law permitted the inter-
vening creditor's claim to prime the homestead's mortgage.
Few surety companies would be willing to write payment and
performance bonds on construction projects in such cases. The
homestead makes its initial commitment with the understanding
that it will have a first mortgage, the security for which will
be a completed building; to permit the homestead's mortgage
to be primed by intervening creditors would obviously expose
the mortgagee's security to dissipation and inhibit many loans
that might otherwise be made.
The unique advantage of the collateral mortgage lies basi-
cally in its flexibility. It can secure obligations other than money
debts, which, of course, must be sooner or later translatable
into sums of money. The exact amount of the obligation, or
even whether the obligation will in fact mature into a money
obligation at all, may be unknown at the outset. The collateral
mortgage can afford adequate security to a creditor where the
borrower does not know the exact amounts or dates when he
will need money, and in situations where the sums may vary.
The collateral mortgage can be used to secure specific future
debts as well as unspecified future debts, and thus has broader
commercial possibilities than the standard conventional mort-
gage. It can secure an open account with a creditor as to which
there are fluctuating balances due to periodic debits and credits.
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The collateral mortgage reduces paper work by permitting the
same security to be used when a debtor changes creditors, since
the mortgage is not extinguished by payment of the original
debt, and it encourages continuous dealings between the original
creditor and the debtor, thereby increasing the ease and flow of
credit to the debtor. As noted earlier, the collateral mortgage
may secure an existing obligation and it may be used to secure
future advances, as a result of which in many instances it
relieves expenses of executing a new mortgage where a new
mortgage is not necessary, for example, where a mortgagor
desires to borrow additional funds to add a room or garage to
his home. The mortgagor can borrow such money from the
mortgagee without having to engage in expensive new financing.
CONCLUSION
One who knows the rules and plays the game by those
rules can use the collateral mortgage with complete confidence
and security, and by the flexibility of the device it fills an
enormous gap in the area of secured credit transactions. It would
be most unfortunate for the collateral mortgage to be legisla-
tively eradicated or judicially emasculated. Mortgage, as stated
earlier, is one of the most powerful security devices and one
of the most popular. The authors submit that, without serious
functional disadvantages, and with numerous functional advan-
tages, the collateral mortgage is and should be a welcome crea-
ture of the jurisprudence and the practitioner's art.
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